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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Whether plaintiffs claim is pre-empted by the Railway Labor Act. 
This is an appeal from the trial court's "Order of Dismissal," (R. 92) which 
granted Delta's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 33) However, Delta's Motion was 
essentially a motion for summary judgment because Delta presented matters 
outside the pleadings (specifically, the Pilot Working Agreement (R. 51)) that 
were not excluded by the trial court. URCP 12(b). 
Rulings made on summary judgment are reviewed for correctness with 
no deference afforded the trial court. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104,107 (Utah 1991). When reviewing a dismissal under URCP 12(b)(6), the 
material allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true, and the trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). The issue on appeal was raised in plaintiffs 
"Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss." (R. 67) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action for damages against Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
("Delta"). (R. 1) Plaintiff also named Delta's managers, Robert Anderson 
and Terry Cusick. (R. 1) However, the individual defendants were never 
served. Delta was served and answered the Complaint. (R. 18) 
Shortly after, Delta filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. 33) Delta contended 
that since plaintiffs employment was governed by a collective bargaining 
agreement, namely, the Pilot Working Agreement, (R. 51) his claims were 
pre-empted by the Railway Labor Act. (R. 37) 
Specifically, Delta contended that its "right to investigate a pilot's 
claim of illness emanates directly from specific provisions in the [Pilot 
Working] Agreement." (R. 37) Delta claimed that the trial court "would be 
required to interpret the [Pilot Working] Agreement." (Id.) Delta claimed that 
as a result, "any purported state law claim is preempted by the [Railway 
Labor Act]." (Id.) 
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition. (R. 67) Plaintiff 
explained that he did not dispute Delta's right to investigate sick leave. (RR. 
67-68) Significantly, plaintiff explained that Delta's sick leave investigation 
did not prevent him from taking his ceremonial last flight. (R. 68) 
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Plaintiff explained that Delta withheld his flight privileges for reasons 
that had nothing to do with its sick leave investigation. (R. 68) Plaintiff 
explained that for this reason, his claim did not require interpretation of the 
Pilot Working Agreement. (Id.) 
Delta filed a Reply Memorandum. (R. 77) Thereafter, Delta's Motion 
was submitted to the trial court for decision. (R. 84) 
In a one-page Minute Entry, (R. 90) the trial court granted Delta's 
Motion to Dismiss. The trial court concluded "that the plaintiff[']s claims 
could not be resolved without some analysis of the terms and conditions of 
plaintiff[']s rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement." (Id.) 
An Order of Dismissal was entered by the trial court on December 20, 
1999. (R. 92) Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on January 17, 2000. (R. 
95) On March 16, 2000, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. (R. 
101) 
On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals made a Sua Sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition. The Court noted that "this is a multiple party case and 
yet the order of dismissal only involved one defendant, Delta Airlines [sic]." 
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The Motion was briefed by both parties. On June 30, 2000, the Court 
entered its Order of Remand. (R. 103) The case was "temporarily remanded 
to the trial court for consideration of Rule 54(b) certification...." 
In order to solve the jurisdictional problem, plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Individual Defendants. (R. 112) Based thereon, the trial court 
dismissed the action against the individual defendants with prejudice. (R. 
121) 
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Notice of Appeal (R. 123), and this case 
was scheduled for briefing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff was a thirty-year veteran pilot of Delta. (R. 3, |^8) 
2. By FAA regulation, pilots must retire by age 60. (R. 4, ^ [16) 
3. Plaintiffs 60th birthday was January 3, 1997. (R. 4, f 17) 
4. Accordingly, plaintiffs last date of employment was January 3, 1997. 
(R. 3,19) 
5. Delta observed a custom in the airline industry of permitting a retiring 
pilot to take one last commercial flight as a ceremonial gesture. (R. 4, 
118) 
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6. Delta confirmed the custom and plaintiffs right to a ceremonial last 
flight in a letter to plaintiff dated September 30, 1996. (R. 4, f22) 
7. Plaintiff scheduled his last flight with the company many weeks in 
advance of his retirement. (R. 5, ^23) 
8. It was scheduled for December 31, 1996 to January 2, 1996. (R. 5,1J24) 
9. On December 22, 1996, plaintiff was placed on a third consecutive 
"short call" status starting December 23, 1996. (R. 6, |36) 
10. Plaintiff advised the Crew Scheduler that he was not feeling well. (R. 6, 
137) 
11. Plaintiff got a call the next day (December 23,1996) from Delta's 
Chief Pilot in Los Angeles. (R. 6, f46) 
12. Plaintiff was informed that he had been "suspended" starting December 
22,1996 to January 2, 1997 for abusing sick leave policy. (R. 6, f47) 
13. The Chief Pilot knew that plaintiff was retiring on January 3, 1997 and 
that he had planned his last, ceremonial flight for December 31, 1996 to 
January 2, 1997. (R. 7,149) 
14. The Chief Pilot specifically told plaintiff that he was going to miss his 
last, ceremonial flight. (R. 7, f48) 
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15. The Chief Pilot told plaintiff to be in Los Angeles the day after 
Christmas (December 26, 1996) with a note from his doctor justifying 
his sick leave. (R. 7, f 53) 
16. On December 24, 1996, plaintiff told the Chief Pilot that because of the 
Christmas holiday, he could not get in to see his doctor until December 
27, 1996. (R. 7,154) 
17. The Chief Pilot said nothing about that, but took the opportunity to 
inform plaintiff that his status as line-check airman had also been 
revoked. (R. 7, f 55) 
18. Plaintiff saw his doctor on December 27, 1996 and received a 
certification of his condition. (R. 7, ^56) 
19. Plaintiff called the Chief Pilot immediately after seeing his doctor. (R. 
7,157) 
20. Plaintiff was prepared to fax a copy of the doctor's certification. (R. 7, 
1f58) 
21. However, the Chief Pilot left the office early that day for the weekend. 
(R. 8, H61) 
22. Plaintiff flew to Los Angeles on Monday, December 30, 1996. (R. 8, 
162) 
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23. Plaintiff met that day with the Chief Pilot in Los Angeles who spoke 
with the Chief Pilot in Atlanta over the telephone. (R. 8,163) 
24. At the meeting, plaintiff provided the Chief Pilots with all of the 
justification for his sick leave. (R. 8, 164) 
25. The Chief Pilots took no action that day. (R. 9, 174) 
26. They knew that plaintiffs last flight was scheduled for the next day 
(December 31, 1996). (R. 9,175) 
27. They knew that in order for plaintiff to make his last flight, they needed 
to act that day (December 30, 1996). (R. 9, f 76) 
28. They purposefully waited another day before taking action. (R. 9, 178) 
29. They did this because they knew it would be too late for plaintiff to 
make his ceremonial flight. (R. 9,179) 
30. Plaintiff missed his last flight because his flight privileges were not 
restored until it was too late for him to make his last flight. (R. 9,181) 
3 J!. Plaintiff filed a "grievance" against the company as he thought he was 
required to do by the Pilot Working Agreement. (R. 10,196) 
32. However, there was no way to restore his last flight since FAA 
regulation prohibited him from flying after age 60. (R. 11,197) 
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33. He could not request any compensation for loss of his last flight. (R. 
11,1198-99) 
34. All he could do was request that his record be cleared and that the 
company issue him an apology. (R. 11, 1100) 
35. Plaintiffs grievance was heard by the Delta Pilots' System Board of 
Adjustment. (R. 11,1101) 
36. Following a hearing, the Board ordered plaintiffs personnel files 
"expunged of all correspondence and material relating to this case." (R. 
11,1102) 
37. However, Delta made no apology. (R. 11,1103) 
38. During his thirty years employment with Delta, plaintiffs record was 
spotless. (R. 3,110) 
39. He never had an accident; never failed a check-ride; and was never 
disciplined by the company or the FAA. (R. 3,111) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff has stated state-law claims for civil conspiracy, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and breach of implied contract. Those claims 
can be resolved without interpreting the Pilot Working Agreement. Plaintiffs 
right to a ceremonial last flight does not appear in the Pilot Working 
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Agreement. It is the subject of custom and implied contract, which is not 
based on and does not require interpretation of the Pilot Working Agreement. 
Furthermore, plaintiff has alleged that his flight privileges were withheld for 
reasons that had nothing to do with Delta's sick leave investigation. This was 
the result of retaliatory action by Delta after plaintiff exercised sick leave. 
For these reasons, plaintiffs state-law claims are not pre-empted by the 
Railway Labor Act. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. PLAINTIFF'S STATE-LAW CLAIMS ARE NOT BASED ON 
AND DO DEPEND ON INTERPRETATION OF THE PILOT 
WORKING AGREEMENT FOR THEIR RESOLUTION. 
The United States Supreme Court has made plain that "not every 
dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a 
collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions 
of the federal labor law."1 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, All U.S. 202, 211 
(1985). Consequently, federal labor law, including the Railway Labor Act, 
does not pre-empt "state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and 
obligations, independent of a labor contract." Id. at 212. 
1
 It does not matter which Act is in question because the pre-emption provisions of the Railway Labor Act 
are no broader than those of the Labor Management Relations Act. Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass'n. 88 F.3d 831, 
836 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), 
the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the Allis-Chalmers test for 
determining whether a state-law claim is pre-empted by federal labor law: 
[Section] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will 
be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, 
and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide 
to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend 
upon the interpretation of such agreements. In other words, even 
if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining 
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would 
require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the 
state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the 
agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for 
§ 301 pre-emption purposes. 
486 U.S. at 409-10 (emphasis added). See also Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 968 (Utah 1992). 
Delta persuaded the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs action by 
mischaracterizing his complaint. Onpg. 10 of its Memorandum, Delta 
claimed that "[t]he crux of [plaintiffs] claim is his contention that Delta 
improperly conducted an investigation based on its suspicion that he had 
abused sick leave." (R. 45) Delta went on to say that "Peterson challenges 
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both Delta's right to investigate and its conduct during its investigation of his 
use of sick leave on December 22, 1996." (R. 47)2 
Delta characterized plaintiffs claim in this manner to make it fit within 
Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1992). In Mock, the 
10th Circuit held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were pre-empted because 
"[plaintiffs' claims all arose out of the manner in which [the 
defendant] conducted its investigation of suspected employee 
misconduct,....Under the [collective bargaining agreement 
("CBA")], [the defendant] could conduct such an investigation of 
suspected employee misconduct,....An analysis of whether [the 
defendant] acted properly or not will inevitably require an 
analysis of what the CBA permitted." 
971F.2dat530. 
However, Mock has been distinguished in two subsequent cases 
involving claims of civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. In Albertson's, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478 (10th Cir. 1993), the 
10th Circuit held: 
In the case before us, there is no doubt that many, if not all, of 
the same factual issues and disputes will have to be resolved in 
arbitrating the discharge under the CBA as in determining the 
conspiracy or outrageous conduct claim. But, it is also true that 
if plaintiffs can show defendants conspired to have [one of the 
plaintiffs] arrested by fabricating her theft of groceries from her 
2
 This passage of Delta's Memorandum was underlined in pencil, probably by the trial court. 
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employer, proving their outrageous conduct need not require 
interpretation of or reference to the CBA. 
982 F.2d at 1482. 
The court held that the same was true in Garley v. Sandia Corporation, 
236 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001): 
In the instant case, as in Albertson 's, the plaintiffs civil 
conspiracy claim is predicated on an allegation that management 
sought to frame the plaintiff for misconduct. Likewise here, as 
in Albertson's, though addressing the conspiracy claim would 
involve many of the same factual inquiries as assessing the 
plaintiffs discharge under the CBA, because the focus of the 
claim is on the defendant's alleged conspiring against the 
plaintiff (an inquiry analytically distinct from whether its actions 
were permitted by the CBA), we conclude that it is not 
preempted by § 301. 
236F.3datl212. 
What was true for the civil conspiracy claim was also true for the claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Garley, the claim had two 
factual predicates: (1) actions leading to plaintiffs dismissal; and (2) 
"continued retaliatory acts." 236 F.3d at 1214. 
The court concluded that "[determining whether [the employer's] 
conduct during its investigation of [plaintiff] was 'outrageous,' an element of 
the tort, requires construction of [the employer's] rights and obligations under 
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the CBA as that is the reference point against which [the employer's] action 
must be scrutinized." 236 F.3d at 1214. As a result, this part of the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim was pre-empted. Id. 
However, the court also concluded that "[t]he fact that [plaintiffs] 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, to the extent that it is 
based on [the employer's] actions leading to his dismissal, is preempted by § 
301, does not require us to arrive at the same conclusion with respect to 
[plaintiffs] second factual predicate for his claim - [the employer's] alleged 
retaliatory actions taken following the arbitrator's ruling." 236 F.3d at 1214. 
The court noted that "[w]e are not required to find preemption in every 
conceivable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress which arises 
from conduct in the work place." 236 F.3d at 1214 (quotation omitted). The 
court concluded by stating "we find that to the extent [plaintiffs] claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on [the employer's] 
retaliatory acts, we conclude that the claim is not preempted and reverse." Id. 
Part of the reason for this is that the "conduct and motivation of the 
employer" does not require "a court to interpret any term of a collective-
bargaining agreement." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. The 10 Circuit has 
similarly stated: "So long as the state law cause of action is concerned not 
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with the employer's contractual right to discharge the employee, but rather 
with its motives in exercising that right, the CBA is not relevant and 
preemption does not apply." Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Services Co., 985 
F.2d 1419, 1427 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Part of the reason is also that "if we were to hold § 301 preempts 
plaintiffs state law claim [in Albertson 's\ that defendants conspired to set her 
up for arrest and imprisonment just because the same factual disputes would 
be present in arbitration under the CBA, it would seem to be virtually 
impossible for a plaintiff to set out a state claim when the complaint also 
states a federal §301 claim or a grievance procedure is commenced under the 
CBA. We cannot reconcile such a conclusion with Lingle" 982 F.2d at 1482-
83. 
Though stated somewhat differently, the Utah Supreme Court has 
seemingly reach the same conclusion. In Retherford v. AT&T, supra, the 
court stated that "courts seem to have distinguished between situations in 
which the defendant has misused his or her authority under a collective 
bargaining agreement to torment the plaintiff and situations in which the 
defendant has inflicted the distress through conduct that is purely personal 
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and does not implicate the exercise of supervisory authority." 844 P.2d at 971 
(citations omitted). 
The court stated: "We find that this distinction has merit and apply it to 
[plaintiffs] emotional distress claim.55 844 P.2d at 972. The court allowed 
plaintiffs emotional distress claim "[t]o the extent that [plaintiffs] tort claim 
is premised upon allegations of purely personal misconduct, as opposed to 
misconduct under color of possible contractual authority,....55 Id. 
There is little chance that Delta was acting under color of possible 
contractual authority. Plaintiffs last flight does not appear in the Pilot 
Working Agreement. It is the subject of custom and implied contract that had 
nothing to do with Delta's sick leave investigation. If Delta withheld 
plaintiffs flight privileges in retaliation for his exercise of sick leave, that is 
evidence of "purely personal55 rather than official misconduct. There is no 
other way to explain the Chief Pilot's statement "that [plaintiff] was going to 
miss his last flight55 before the sick leave investigation concluded. (R. 7, ^48) 
To make it clear, plaintiffs complaint is not with the sick leave 
investigation. Plaintiff believes that Delta took some unauthorized action 
during the sick leave investigation. (RR. 8-9, ffl[66-69, 71, 73) However, 
those instances were cited as evidence of Delta's motivation to later deny his 
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ceremonial last flight. Plaintiffs complaint centers on the loss of his 
ceremonial last flight, not on unauthorized actions taken by Delta during the 
sick leave investigation. Once the sick leave investigation concluded, there is 
no way that Delta was acting under color of possible contractual authority 
when it continued to withhold plaintiffs flight privileges. 
This case is just like Lingle, supra. Even though defendants claimed 
that they acted lawfully in terminating plaintiff under the terms of the CBA, 
plaintiff claimed that their true motivation was to retaliate against her for 
filing a worker's compensation claim. Plaintiffs claim was allowed to 
proceed in the face of a claim of federal pre-emption. There is no difference 
between Lingle (and the cases that follow it) and this case. 
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), the Supreme 
Court ruled that "a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is 
permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-
law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective-
bargaining agreement." 482 U.S. at 396. 
Plaintiffs ceremonial last flight was the subject of custom and implied 
contract, (R. 4, ffl[18, 22) not the Pilot Working Agreement. (R. 51) 
Importantly, there has been no allegation that plaintiffs ceremonial last flight 
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was inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Pilot Working Agreement. 
See Retherford, 844 P.2d at 968-69. For this reason, there is no need for the 
trial court to make reference to the Pilot Working Agreement in resolving 
plaintiffs claim. 
At one point, Delta suggested that in order to avoid federal pre-
emption, plaintiffs claims must be based on "independent statutory rights." 
(R. 46, n.6) However, the Supreme Court made clear that Lingle 's claim 
"was not based on any specific statutory provision,...." 486 U.S. at 407 n.6. 
In Retherford, the Utah Supreme Court specifically upheld common law tort 
claims (negligent employment; intentional infliction of emotional distress) in 
the face of a federal pre-emption claim. 844 P.2d at 974. This claim of a need 
for "independent statutory rights" is merely Delta's invention. 
Finally, it does not matter that plaintiff filed a grievance with the Delta 
Pilots' System Board of Adjustment. Plaintiff filed his grievance because he 
thought he had to. (R. 10, TJ96) Plaintiff prevailed on the grievance, but the 
Board did the only thing it could and cleared plaintiffs record of any 
wrongdoing. (R. 11, fflflOO, 102) The Board could not restore plaintiffs last 
flight. (R. 11, |97) The Board could not award any damages. (R. 11, ffl[98-
99) 
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It is obvious that this action and plaintiffs grievance stand on 
completely different footings. This action is plaintiffs only chance to seek 
redress for the loss of his last flight. Besides, "the mere fact that [plaintiff] 
might be able to grieve the employer under procedures provided in the 
collective bargaining agreement is not sufficient in itself to conclude that 
[plaintiffs] tort claims are preempted." Fry v. Airline Pilots Association, 88 
F.3dat841. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs ceremonial last flight was based on custom and implied 
contract, not on the Pilot Working Agreement. Notwithstanding, plaintiffs 
last flight is perfectly consistent with the Pilot Working Agreement. 
Therefore, plaintiffs last flight is "independent" of the Pilot Working 
Agreement and not pre-empted by federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 
471 U.S. at 211. 
The action complained of by plaintiff occurred after Delta completed or 
should have completed its sick leave investigation. Delta should have 
restored plaintiffs flight privileges at that time. It did not because, as 
plaintiff has alleged, it wanted to make an example out of him to other pilots. 
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This was no part of Delta's contractual authority. Delta had the 
authority to withhold plaintiffs flight privileges so long as its investigation 
continued. However, if it continued to withhold plaintiffs flight privileges 
when its investigation was satisfied and concluded, for reasons that had 
nothing to do with a lawful sick leave investigation, this was purely the result 
of purely personal misconduct and is not barred by federal pre-emption. 
Delta's conduct should not be upheld simply because its managers did 
not follow plaintiff around making threats. The law does not countenance 
improper conduct simply because it was subtle. There is nothing to say that 
subtle conduct may not be "outrageous." There is nothing to say that the 
effect on plaintiff was not "severe." 
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of Dismissal (R. 92) should be 
REVERSED. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ k a y of August, 2001. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
By 
fonald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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